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La memoire amnesique 
La philosophie, d'aprbs Gayatri Spivak, s'inscrit sous le signe d'Edipe. 
Elle s'e'labore b travers une rhe'torique ancre'e dans le ftminin, mais elle ne 
peut gubre imaginer un sujet au fe'minin. Dans cetteoptique, les re'flexions 
de Nietzsche sur la question de l'amne'sie peuvent 2tre lues comme un 
commentaire sur les lacunes de sa propre re'flexion. Selon Zucker, le 
philosophe pratique la politique de l'autruche ; il cache sa t2te dans la 
mattrialitt linguistique, oubliant le r6le mtdiateur de cette mattrialite'et 
sa detteau corps fe'minin. Cet essai met en relief l'e'conomiesexutedu texte 
de Nietzsche, dont un des exemples les plus remarquables est la fe'minisa- 
tion de l'amntsie. 
If as Gayatri Spivak suggests, the history of Western philosophy has also 
been the history of its oedipalization (Spivak 35), then it is important for 
feminists to reread philosophical texts and to determine how the sign of 
the feminine has been fetishized in relation to generalized oedipal 
inscriptions of textual blindness, denial of desire, and amnesia. To what 
degree have philosophical texts framed the literary question of displace- 
ment and its attendant amnesiac ideological exclusions as feminine? 
What kinds of forgetfulness have been necessary for the discipline of 
philosophy to assure the intact relay of masterful understanding? 
The text of Nietzsche is a particularly rich site for such readings, 
beginning with the extensive work on memory and hypnosis in On the 
Genealogy of Morals in relation to the question of the master-slave rela- 
tionship and ultimately to the sign of the feminine. I will attempt, in the 
following paper, to trace Nietzsche's genealogy of the "science of 
memory" particularly in relation to his philosophical articulation of the 
feminine. This discussion is inseparable from a discussion of his inscrip- 
tion of "understanding" and its semiocentric inversion in a complex of 
motifs concerned with "standing under," and with a peculiarly "inde- 
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cent" weakness in the legs which seems to accompany it. Ultimately, I 
will read Nietzsche's text as an an-aesthetic with its own set of amnesiac 
exclusions and I will raise the question of the value of such an-aesthesia 
to the political project of feminism. 
On the Genealogy of Morals traces the historic use of what Nietzsche 
refers to as "mnemotechnics," that is, the use of hypnosis to "burn a 
memory" into the mind of the ascetic slave so that the pain which the 
latter suffers as slave is displaced and "remembered" as the text of pain 
(GM 61). Under hypnosis, the slave begins to "exist" insofar as he turns 
to himself into an object of exchange and converges upon his own pain 
as a series of affects which are in turn translated into the language of 
those affects. In this way, the slave's "condition of existence" is the effect 
of translation; his "cause" is figured as the effect of affects, separated 
from their putative meanings by semiocentric inversion. In short, the 
slave has come to speculate upon his own suffering, multiplying and 
scattering its affects, which in turn allows the internalization of greater 
and greater amounts of displaced pain "in the same measure as outward 
discharge [i]s inhibited" (GM 84). The slave is encouraged to will the 
repression and inversion of the metaphysical categories of cause and 
effect, even to enjoy the pain, since he is figured in this process as the 
entrepreneur of his own affects. The burning of memory may be read, 
then, as the burning in of a certain unacknowledged amnesia brought 
about by the "chronological reversal" of cause and effect (WP 804). 
Moreover, this amnesia is feminized by Nietzsche in terms of pregnancy. 
According to Nietzsche's account of the historic use of "mnemotech- 
nics," the slave's interior world gradually becomes a "womb" which is 
"pregnant with a future," inflating with the proliferation of internalized 
and translated affects (GM 85/87). 
Nietzsche's Genealogy reads less like a historical text than a psycholin- 
guistic manual with a fully elaborated terminology for the science of 
memory, and as such is consistent with his earlier investigations into 
hypnosis as a rhetorical "science" (CR ). In an ostensibly neutral scientific 
mode, the analysis of "mnemotechnics" begins to reduce the metaphys- 
ical ideal of a fully conscious mind to the materiality of a body, yet the 
politicized term which bears the burden of repressed pain issuing from 
this dialectic is that of the feminine, specifically that of the womb. 
However, Nietzsche also stipulates that any ultimate attempt on the part 
of science to reduce the spirit to materiality without metaphysical 
presuppositions (of mind) constitutes a violation of epistemological 
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decency. It is "faith" and the subjective mental processes which supply 
science with its direction, its meaning, its methods, and even its right to 
exist.: "Whoever tries, for example, to place philosophy "on a strictly 
scientific basis," first needs to stand not only philosophy but truth itself 
on its head - the grossest violation of decency possible in relation to two 
such venerable females!" (GM 151-52). Yet again there has been a dialec- 
tical inversion involving amnesia, the forgetting of mind, and again the 
term which is introduced to serve as host for the violation is female. 
The reference here is to Hegel's investigation of the question of man's 
empirical understanding as a question of standing under: "to center 
himself on his head, i.e.: in thought, and to construct reality according to 
it" (Hegel 447). Authority was thus given to subjectivity (the mind) by 
reifying it and grafting it to the material world in the hopes of bringing 
the latter within the subject's control. Fallen to the ground, the head 
"forgets" to find anything amiss, anything in opposition to it, organizing 
a perception of the ground as merely the mirror image of subjectivity. 
Before meaning can be affixed to it, the mind must be objectified so that 
it becomes a textualization or translation of the ground, and the ground 
becomes in turn a mediated or textualized sign of mind, personified. 
Subjectivity "forgets" or misunderstands these mediations, bringing 
their synthesis into possibility in forms subversively projected without 
acknowledgement (Hamacher 1985). What is particularly forgotten in 
the Hegelian synthesis is that in the attempt to achieve the dream of an 
unmediated grasp of materiality, the mind has had to internalize the 
polarized functions of understanding and standing under, metaphorically 
sticking its head in the sand to suppress the difference. For Hegel, this 
difference is sublimated in a final moment of Aufhebung or synthesis, but 
for Nietzsche the sublimation becomes downright indecent. Hegel's 
synthesis is indecent not only because of the mind-body split which it 
has initiated but because it forgets (is without) a knowledge of what it is 
without, paradoxically redoubling its lack and calling attention to it in the 
act of "stopping" the dialectical movement. For Nietzsche, forgetting to 
acknowledge the movement results in a gross violation of decency, 
displacing the sign of lack to another site which is even more visible, not 
to mention ancient and female. Yet it is Nietzsche, not Hegel, who femi- 
nizes the indecently flailing legs of Hegelian "understanding," thus 
forgetting, it would seem, that he himself has a hand in the display. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, the problem of memory appears with yet 
another set of oppositions involving the difference between "sin" and 
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"sacrilege." On the "Semitic" side is the passive and "feminine" notion 
of sin typified, tellingly, by the myth of the fall, and by a multiplicity of 
petty acts: "curiosity, mendacious deception, susceptibility to seduc- 
tion, lies" (BT 71). On the "sublime" and "Aryan" side is the Promethean 
version of "active sin" or "sacrilege" which involves a single, much 
grander crime - the crime of attempting to act like a god without the 
acknowledgement of difference, the attempt to forget the curse of indi- 
viduation and to become "the one world-being" by stealing "the best and 
highest possession mankind can acquire." The result of such subver- 
siveness is that "he suffers in his own person the primordial contradic- 
tion that is concealed in things" (BT 71). The Promethean sacrilege in 
question, "that man should freely dispose of fire without receiving it as 
a present from heaven," involves the internalization of a greater debt 
than that of sin, the debt incurred by pretending to be without the inter- 
ference of prior representation, translating oneself into the duplication 
of Logos and forgetting or internalizing the gap between mankind and 
godhead. In this way a noble and tragic (and male) crime has been 
committed, as opposed to Eve's theft of knowledge which constituted a 
pettier crime involving not active creativity but a passive submission to 
suggestion. Yet the Promethean tragedy of noble sacrilege comes danger- 
ously close to Hegelian Aufhebung, actively seeking to become "the one 
world-being" by suspending the enormous contradiction and debt 
incurred by forgetting that one is "without" the curse of differentiation. 
For Nietzsche, the immemorial suspension or gap in the structure of 
meaning is indecent, and its attendant lag is obscurely related to a weak- 
ness in the legs. Sacrilege, the active "masculine" crime, involves a single 
such gap or lag characterized by a larger stride; sin, the passive "femi- 
nine" crime typical of the slave, involves a multiplicity of petty gaps or 
lags characterized by numerous little steps (BT 71-72). Nietzsche's binary 
opposition between sin and sacrilege inscribes Eve as the transgressor 
who is acting passively as the mere reflection of a suggestion from an 
external source, whereas Prometheus' transgression is autonomous. But 
one could note that both agents are acting "autonomously" insofar as 
they are reflections or versions which diverge from a prior representa- 
tion, incurring a multitude of gaps or repressions as the logical outcome 
of the slide of the "first" male gap. When a "deity" is said to create a 
version or representation of himself, a schism has been introduced into 
the notion of universality which in turn has the potential to generate an 
infinity of schisms. If anything, Eve's "pettier" act could well be read as 
more rigorously subversive than that of her male counterpart since it 
cannot afford the luxurious assumption of priority or privilege and 
indeed calls into question the possibility of such autonomy for anyone. 
The "pettiness" or passivity of Eve's "autonomy," dependent as it is on 
external forces, is precisely what throws into question the entire concept 
of a unified, determinable conscious ego, separable from the instability 
of representation. Her act is autonomous insofar as it necessarily occurs 
as a movement in the displacement of representation. As the representa- 
tion of representation, Eve is the sign of the slide and instability of the 
entire logocentric system of Western culture, re-formed from an already 
derivative model (Adam) with excessive individuation and reflexivity. 
As sign, she calls into question the possibility of any original or 
autonomous ego or act and returns us to the problem of displacement 
which has always already been obliterated from memory. 
This representation of femininity as the host for the problem of 
displacement is not new to Nietzsche's writing. In the Nietzschean 
oeuvre, woman frequently appears as the sign which bears the burden of 
the discourse of idealism with all of its exclusive and amnesiac ideolog- 
ical formations (Blondel). Hence philosophy and truth appear inverted 
in a Hegelian headstand, their feminine sexuality safely dysfunctional 
but nevertheless capable of invoking revulsion. For Nietzsche, woman is 
the version of versions, repetition itself and thus petty, a translation of 
the material ground of understanding as standing under. Woman, like 
knowledge, can only ever embody error and amnesia, a mere outline of 
outlines, and worst of all, arbitrariness and accident. Yet because the 
accidental outline of the signifier is crucial to Nietzsche's own attempt to 
move beyond the artificially arrested dialectic of Hegel, the figure of 
woman also constitutes a threat. "Her" potential for accident and disper- 
sal without limit is capable of disseminating Nietzsche's entire enter- 
prise. In Ecce Horno, for example, the philosopher evokes the phantasm 
of being torn to pieces by the "perfect woman" who, in her "subter- 
ranean" agreeability is nothing more or less than "a little beast of prey" 
(EH 255). What is glaringly apparent in both this example and in the 
example of the indecently flailing legs of idealism is a horror of the femi- 
nine potential for submissive weakness and dispersion. Confronted 
with such structural weakness, the understanding can only invert itself 
in the earth and ultimately go to pieces, lost in an Orphic phantasm of 
dispersal which "would run over fate itself." Without the reserve 
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implicit in Nietzsche's notion of amor fati, female instability is the para- 
site which preys on his dialectic, preventing it from maintaining its 
control of fate (EH 85). 
Elsewhere, the fear of excessive dispersal of understanding is 
expressed with explicit reference to the reception of Nietzsche's text, 
especially those parts in the argument which veer furthest from idealism 
in their reduction to materiality, and which are thus most prone to acci- 
dental appropriation and misrepresentation (GS 196). The gravity of this 
prospect is associated with the precariousness and even terror which 
attends all texts whose materiality can only signal coherence in the form 
of a promise of meaning which is vulnerable to forgetting, misappropri- 
ation, and even mischief on the part of the reader (Hamacher 1983). The 
text thus returns to the feminine obscenity and head-in-the-sand 
evasions of idealism. Can Nietzsche avoid such a prospect? 
Nietzsche's description of the promissory master is that of a "born 
pied piper of consciousness whose voice knows how to descend to the 
underworld of every soul." Despite fearful references elsewhere to the 
fate of Orpheus, torn apart by the "feminine" textual principle of subter- 
ranean dispersal, Nietzsche's project would seem to involve seeking out 
the subterranean consciousness of his reader. Yet the descent to this 
underworld of mind ultimately converges upon its own rnateriality, and 
encounters, if not the feminine obscenity of idealism, then a sodomous 
version of it. The promissory master is a manipulator of waste material 
"who guesses the concealed and forgotten treasure.. .and is a divining 
rod for every grain of gold that has long lain buried in the dungeon of 
much mud and sand" (EH 268). Ultimately, this tendency to "guess" the 
reader's future response from out of the past and thus to oscillate back 
and forth between past and future, is to maintain an amnesia with 
regards to the gap of the present moment - an amnesia which compli- 
cates the anal nature of the genealogy of the text [sic]. As anal inter- 
course, Nietzsche's writing falls short of complete fertility, subsisting on 
the materiality of its own discourse as a mere sign of pregnancy: "For 
from the depths one loves only one's child and work; and where there is 
great love of oneself it is the sign of pregnancy. .." (Z 161). The unre- 
solved guesses and empty promises of the "longest, deepest, and 
sternest past," which are only compensated with further gaps, and 
which in turn deepen the fission of the text - all of this may "rise up in us" 
at length as a thing of terror when considered too closely (Z 262).The 
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terror is that of Orphic dispersal, and the tendency to readerly misap- 
propriation is directly related to the bloody debt which is at the funda- 
ment of these texts: "Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects, 
the whole somber thing called reflection, all the prerogatives and show 
pieces of man: how dearly they have been bought! how much blood and 
cruelty lie at the bottom of all 'good things"' (Z 62). 
"At the bottom of all 'good things"' is the gap between past and future 
which prevents Nietzsche's affecting discourse from becoming a 
discourse on affects. The temporal gap is sometimes furtively acknowl- 
edged as feminine, and sometimes as the site of the long, deep, and stern 
extension of the past which rises up in us in moments of gravity, in 
moments when the text signals its acknowledgment of suppressed 
difference from behind its back and in doing so, calls attention to its 
vulnerability and exposure. This chronic lag or weakness in the legs of 
Nietzsche's text is both what constitutes it as a promissory discourse and 
what makes it fall short of immediate realization. Nietzsche's textual 
suggestion, the suggestion of his text, is a double sign founded on a syllo- 
gistic (or hysterical) structure of projection and retraction which in turn 
depends on the promise of coherence in the future. Meanwhile it scatters 
the properties of knowledge and representation in the present. His 
words work as promises precisely because they fail as immediate acts, 
embodying "real" affects only insofar as they are embedded within the 
anticipation of suggestive readers, and fulfilling themselves only with 
further suggestion. The deferral between suggestion and understanding 
or action is what allows the understanding or action to be "autonomous" 
like the problematic autonomy of Eve and Prometheus, a mere version 
or sign of understanding or action which is neither the property of the 
suggestor nor of the suggestee. Because of the gaping nature of this 
understanding, there can be no absolute continuity between word and 
act, nor between affecting discourse and discourse on affects, only the 
problem of the eternal return of faulty memory. Suggestibility remains 
thus a structural necessity of texts (Borsch-Jacobsen). Given the collapse 
of the distinction between suggestor and suggestee, Nietzsche's sugges- 
tive text would seem to be prone to the progressive emasculation attrib- 
uted to the hypnotic slave, whose internalization of pain is linked with 
genital damage: "The most repulsive mutilations (castration, for exam- 
ple), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the 
deepest level systems of cruelties) - all this has its origin in the instinct 
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that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics" (GM 61). Hypnosis is 
perhaps figured here as the inability of suggestion to stand on its own 
two feet. 
In his weaker moments, Nietzsche is prone, as we have seen, to a 
horror vacui, a hysteria which interprets the immemorial fission of the 
text as feminine. The textual gap is contagious, capable of tearing one 
apart if read passively, with vulnerability. Yet active textual suggestion, 
multiplication and dispersal of the text's cutting edge might neutralize 
its fissure through deflection, figuring the catastrophe of interminable 
gaps in order to flatten accident into the mirror image of necessity, even 
if this translates the suggestive writer into an invaginated version of 
himself. In other words, by multiplying perspectives, Nietzsche renders 
himself multiple without awareness of the gaping femininity which his 
text insists it is without. In this sense, the text attempts to neutralize expo- 
sure by returning to it mimetically in a multiplicity of decentered amne- 
siac modes as in the transformative "thanatography" of Ecce Homo 
(Derrida 1985,19 ff). In this sense also, Nietzsche is forced to return many 
times over in the unstable forms of those "venerable females," philoso- 
phy and truth. Thus he, too, is the mere version of versions, the eternal 
return of forgetting, parasitically embedded with the error and accident 
which is the heritage of idealism. The amnesiac contagion of the mater- 
ial text - the translatability of the sign and thus its potential for reversal 
and parasitism is responsible for Nietzsche's simulation of femininity by 
way of a certain muddy dungeon. And the master of irony who wished 
to invert idealism by celebrating the material side of its dialectic - even 
while mouthing disclaimers - has ultimately found himself situated as 
the butt of irony, at bottom prone to an infiltrating parasitism without 
reserve: "All honor to the ascetic ideal insofar as it is honest! so long as it 
believes in itself and does not play tricks on us! But I do not like all these 
coquettish bedbugs with their insatiable ambition to smell out the infi- 
nite, until at last the infinite smells of bedbugs" (Z 158). At bottom is a 
deconstruction of the distinctions between male host and female para- 
site, mocker and mocked, affecting discourse and discourse on affects 
(Behler). 
Thus Nietzsche's story of understanding is, like Hegel's, a story of 
standing under and of the lameness or weakness in the legs which seems 
to attend it and in sequel, amnesiac headlessness (Bataille). The impotent 
rage which rises up in the philosopher at the prospect of his uncontrol- 
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lable parasites recalls the historical moment of impotence which 
occurred when man "found himself finally enclosed within the walls of 
society and peace." Lacking a localizable host for his aggression, he had 
to face himself in a situation of displacement and sublimation similar to 
that of the warlike "sea animals when they were compelled to become 
land animals" so that they became mere "semi-animals," cut down to 
half their stature and suffering from a weakness in the legs. Forced to 
sublimate their instincts rather than discharging them, they suffer from 
the amnesia which Nietzsche calls the "internalization of man." 
However, this internalization and devaluation of the "instincts" is not 
merely the province of animals and slaves. The avowedly "tragic" 
attempt to stand on two feet is also experienced by the Overman, 
Zarathustra, and related in the matched tales included under the title, 
"Of the Vision and the Riddle" (Z 156-58). 
In the first tale, the "leaden discomfort" experienced by the semi- 
animals who must learn to "bear themselves" is translated as the mirror 
figure of a dwarf, "the spirit of gravity," who sits on Zarathustra's shoul- 
ders and taunts him during his mountain climb to a gateway called 
"Moment." The story of the mountain ascent is framed by the tale of a 
journey of descent to the black sorrowful sea below, "this pregnant 
nocturnal dismay," and traces of the oppressive ("female") imagery of 
this frame-tale of descent appear in the story of Zarathustra's mountain 
climb, encumbered by dripping, leaden thoughts, "lame, making lame." 
Zarathustra notes that the gateway is placed at a crossroads where two 
paths meet, contradicting and "offending" each other while leading 
backward and forward into eternity. In this context of sorrow, debilita- 
tion, and contradiction, Zarathustra narrates to his companion, "lame- 
foot," the riddle of the eternal return: "Must not whatever can happen 
have happened, have been done, have passed by before? And if every- 
thing has been there before - what do you think, dwarf, of this moment? 
Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are not all things 
knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to 
come? Therefore - itself too? For whatever can walk-in this long lane out 
there too, it must walk once more. ..must not all of us have been there 
before? And return and walk in that other lane, out there, before us, in 
this long, dreadful lane -must we not eternally return?" (Z 158). 
The name of the gateway is "Augenblick," a German word which refers 
not only to a moment in time but also to the blink of an eye. It is only by 
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an advance eyeblink or moment of forgetting or repression that the 
contradictory pathways leading to this moment canbe inverted. Only by 
being blind to the presence of the moment as well as to its problematiza- 
tion - a self-absorbed act of hubris typified by the contemptuous dwarf- 
mole - can one straddle the contradiction of past and future, and re- 
present them in apparent and perpetual reversals. So too does the 
advance blink of an eye allow cause to appear chiasmically as the effect 
of effect, returned to the memory only through repression and transla- 
tion. And that repression or translation itself can be blinked or winked at 
also, although it "rises up in us" irrepressibly as "the longest, deepest, 
and sternest past" or "before us, in this long dreadful lane" to which we 
must return in moments of gravity. Moments of gravity are moments of 
the return of language from elsewhere, moments in which it is recog- 
nized that even the weakest and most forgettable (thus the most 
"female") of signs can exert a near-insensible and thus perhaps espe- 
cially threatening and parasitic power by way of the inevitable return 
inscribed in language. 
Nietzsche's riddles are language games which invoke the unthink- 
able structure of time, the unthinkable way in which sense perpetually 
lags behind the text, a lag which is somehow related to a horrifying, 
emasculating weakness in the legs. They are tales about protagonists 
who are chronically predisposed to blindness and amnesia so that life 
never quite catches up to its figuration. Irrepressibly, an ancient riddle 
"rises up" in these tales out of the "sternest past," bringing with it a 
horror of gaps and reversible equivalencies, and rendering the memory 
insensible until it is too late. Time in all of these stories of the eternal 
return is always time as an immemorial affect turning on the trope of 
negativity, unconscionably predisposed to equivalency so that the past 
and future, which contradict each other from opposite sides of the gate- 
way entitled Augenblick , also manage repeatedly to replace each other, 
"and walkin that other lane," eternally blind to their own crossings. And 
the "present" moment seems to be inverted as well, drawing after itself 
not only the future ("all that is to come") but "therefore -itself too." The 
present moment is cloven, embodying the contradiction which it 
furtively and perpetually reverses, lost in an amnesiac abyss of repeti- 
tion and reflection. 
Elsewhere, Nietzsche extends the aesthetic ideal of a sort of oceanic 
feeling, the "proud and calm harmony" with which the text should be 
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able to "slope into the sea" as the end approaches (GS 227). However, the 
aesthetic of that easy slope would seem to require its own an-aesthetic, 
an Augenblick regarding a certain loss of support beneath the legs which 
might otherwise evoke unheard-of revulsion and horror. If feminists are 
to trace a political project in the text of Nietzsche, it is perhaps to be found 
in the "feminine" role of an-aesthesia, that is, the submission to (and 
perhaps even phantasmatic celebration of) the soporific forgetfulness of 
textuality, the return to the incipiently obscene misunderstanding which 
opens the deconstruction of the chronically lame stance of masterful 
discourse. 
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